Robert B. Stevens of TASC Inc. has written a paper entitled: “Product Support Decision Support System”. In the paper Mr. Stevens calls for the development of a decision support system to assist the military in planning its logistical support for various missions. Mr. Stevens also is of the opinion that the logistics field has been neglected by the U.S. Military when it comes to logistical influencing factors in combat simulations (wargames). The paper can be found at: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=wargaming+and+decision+support+systems&btnG=Google+Search
The Army traditionally uses Modeling and Simulation (M&S) tools for planning their logistical operations in support of their command. Historically, these tools are used to support global logistic decisions, manage supplies, and test Research and Development (R&D) in the acquisition phase. The problem that is occurring is that as weapon systems become more sophisticated they also become more prone to systems failure. Mr. Stevens specifically points to the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) as a primary reason that the current systems support and decision making software needs to be overhauled.
The original MLRS (the M270) is about 20 years old. It entered service just before I got left. Since then their have been one system wide upgrade (the M270A1) and a new wheeled version of the launcher called the High Mobility Rocket System (HIMARS). This is a lighter version of the original system (the original system being a tracked vehicle). This makes the new launcher lighter and easier to carry via aircraft. Four payloads for the weapon system would take up the carrying capacity of a flatbed eighteen-wheeler. In addition to the logistical nightmare of having to keep the system supplied with ammo, there is the need to provide maintenance, gas, food for the crew, etc., and this is only one of the many combat and support systems in today’s Army.
Of the two problems expressed in Mr. Stevens, the easiest fix for the wargame simulation would be to include the rudimentary logistical issues into the scenario. The possible variables that could be included could be a Mean Time Between Failures, Mean Time to Repair, and Mean Time Between Replacements. In this way the battlefield commander will have to deal with maintenance shortcomings. The more that they push their troops, the greater the mechanical problems that they will face. Decisions made by the commander without these critical data elements in the wargame do not realistically portray the availability of the weapon systems or equipment.
Mr. Stevens stated that: “logistical systems do not analyze the function of supporting individual weapon systems. What present logistic simulations normally capture are the amounts of supplies and services needed to support organizations in a generic sense. Simulations presently do not capture logistic as a collection of activities associated with acquiring, moving, storing, and delivering supply chain commodities to the war fighter. More importantly, critical individual weapon systems are not managed closely in the logistics’ supply chain, including the necessities of manufacturing spares, retailing parts, transportation, distribution, warehousing, material handling, and inventory management.”
The logistical Decision Support System (DSS) that Mr. Stevens is proposing sounds remarkably like a Just In Time (JIT) system. Most of the variables with regards to mean time failures, repairs and replacement activities exist today. What doesn’t exist is the access to a worldwide database that includes all of the Army supply centers as well as all of their suppliers. If a system like this could be developed, it would save the government significant amounts of money. Keeping track of all existing supplies, their locations, transportation resources, and supplier capabilities would allow planners to develop long range support plans to support the armed forces operations.
This system doesn’t exist. The need for it is critical to saving money, time, and lives in a combat situation. Our weapon systems continue to be state of the art; it is a shame that we don’t have a state of the art support system to ensure that they can operate as designed. We need to be able to get the beans, bullets, and band aids where they are needed, before the troops need them. A JIT inventory control system and DSS could provide that capability.
Sunday, April 27, 2008
Saturday, April 26, 2008
Decision Modeling and the Department of Transportation
I recently received a traffic ticket on my university’s campus for driving 35mph in a 20mph zone. The street on which this violation occurred is about 2 miles long. There is a single speed limit sign regulating the zone for the direction of travel I was taking. The sign is placed on the back-side of a blind curve (a hill blocks the view of the sign). The sign is on the left side of the roadway and on the downward slope of a hill that starts just after the curve is negotiated. In addition there are perpendicular parking spaces all along the right side of the road. The last speed limit sign prior to the 20mph sign at this location is a 35mph sign on the adjacent roadway. The 20 mph sign is also located approximately 1 mile into the two mile long road.
I realize that my opinion is probable biased concerning this matter, but it didn’t seem fair to me when I was issued the ticket. I traveled the roadway the next two days looking for a speed sing but couldn’t find one that is until the third day when I walked the entire two miles of the street. I started researching street sign placement regulations on the internet shortly there after. I was able to locate the “Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways” (2003 edition), U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. The manual can be found at: http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/sitemap.htm
The remarkable thing that I found during my research was how much of the material in my Decision Support Systems class and text was used in the design of streets and highway signage and the rules associated with their placement. One additional critical factor was also involved in the process of designing the system, and that was the time factor. Signage needs to be identified, understood and reacted upon. In this case, the manual states that the entire process takes about 6 seconds or as the manual refers to the statistic as “the six second rule”.
The rules regulating street sign placement directly compare with the decision support rules concerning user presentation. First of all, street signs should appear on the right side of the road. Similar to an individual always looking in the upper right hand corner of their window application for the minimize button. If a sign is placed on the left side of the roadway, then it is “out of place” and will take longer for a user to identify. This is why I never found the sign until I walked the street. A second rule concerning signage is that the bottom of the sign must be at least 7 feet above the pavement. In the case of the sign on this street it was only 5 feet. The reason for this is so that oncoming traffic or pedestrian traffic does not block the line of sight to the sign. As the sign was placed on the backside of a hill, this further exasperated the situation. An oncoming car of pedestrian on the sidewalk in front of the sign completely obscured its view. This would be similar to having a popup window cover the control features on a screen or a warning popup being called up behind another screen.
The last item that I found in researching this issue is that speed limit signs shall be located at the points of change from one speed limit to another. In a decision support system the sign placement in this situation would be akin to having a warning window activate after you have closed the application for which the warning was issued. In all, the placement of the only speed limit sign on this road left much to be desired. In fact, there isn’t just about anywhere else on the roadway where it could have been worse.
I intend to fight this ticket, not just because I feel that the speed limit sign was improperly placed as established by the “Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways.” No, I intend to fight this ticket because of the basic violations of the entire streets signage design as it compares to good decision support systems design. All hail Information Systems.
Whew – I’m glade I got that off my chest. Happy motoring.
I realize that my opinion is probable biased concerning this matter, but it didn’t seem fair to me when I was issued the ticket. I traveled the roadway the next two days looking for a speed sing but couldn’t find one that is until the third day when I walked the entire two miles of the street. I started researching street sign placement regulations on the internet shortly there after. I was able to locate the “Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways” (2003 edition), U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. The manual can be found at: http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/sitemap.htm
The remarkable thing that I found during my research was how much of the material in my Decision Support Systems class and text was used in the design of streets and highway signage and the rules associated with their placement. One additional critical factor was also involved in the process of designing the system, and that was the time factor. Signage needs to be identified, understood and reacted upon. In this case, the manual states that the entire process takes about 6 seconds or as the manual refers to the statistic as “the six second rule”.
The rules regulating street sign placement directly compare with the decision support rules concerning user presentation. First of all, street signs should appear on the right side of the road. Similar to an individual always looking in the upper right hand corner of their window application for the minimize button. If a sign is placed on the left side of the roadway, then it is “out of place” and will take longer for a user to identify. This is why I never found the sign until I walked the street. A second rule concerning signage is that the bottom of the sign must be at least 7 feet above the pavement. In the case of the sign on this street it was only 5 feet. The reason for this is so that oncoming traffic or pedestrian traffic does not block the line of sight to the sign. As the sign was placed on the backside of a hill, this further exasperated the situation. An oncoming car of pedestrian on the sidewalk in front of the sign completely obscured its view. This would be similar to having a popup window cover the control features on a screen or a warning popup being called up behind another screen.
The last item that I found in researching this issue is that speed limit signs shall be located at the points of change from one speed limit to another. In a decision support system the sign placement in this situation would be akin to having a warning window activate after you have closed the application for which the warning was issued. In all, the placement of the only speed limit sign on this road left much to be desired. In fact, there isn’t just about anywhere else on the roadway where it could have been worse.
I intend to fight this ticket, not just because I feel that the speed limit sign was improperly placed as established by the “Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways.” No, I intend to fight this ticket because of the basic violations of the entire streets signage design as it compares to good decision support systems design. All hail Information Systems.
Whew – I’m glade I got that off my chest. Happy motoring.
Monday, April 7, 2008
Modeling the Chaos of Battle
Booz Allen Hamilton, a leading global consulting firm, and has 19,000 employees serving clients on six continents. Booz Allen helps government and commercial clients solve their toughest problems with services in strategy, operations, organization and change, and information technology. The company boasts of a full range of consulting capabilities. One of the projects that the firm has assisted the U.S. military with is the development of a combat simulator (wargame), which went into active service in 1997. The firm’s web site describing this model can be found at: http://www.boozallen.com/capabilities/services/services_article/1440526?lpid=39070430
Booz Allen Hamilton has developed an Entropy-Based Warfare model that is used to create hypothetical wargaming situations reflecting the US military's vision of future warfare, in which the country's Armed Services increasingly embrace cutting-edge technologies to help achieve an advantage over adversaries. The entropy-based warfare model simulates the combined effects of friction, disruption, and lethality found in the modern battlefield in the adversary’s behavior. Developed jointly with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and unveiled in 1997, it's a computerized tool capable of modeling the full range of military actions (including conflict in the air, sea, ground, space, and cyberspace domains) in a single, integrated manner that (according to the company) better represents future warfare.
Virtually all previous models, simulations, and wargames were fundamentally attrition based and lacked the ability to account for the effects of friction and disruption that could be achieved by various other means short of physical or lethal force. Analytically they often provided quantitative results that support one recommendation over another. But they did not account for many factors that affect the outcome. The few that did quantify factors like command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, jamming, and reconnaissance lack an analytic construct to accurately account for their effects. They simply measured the influence of these factors as increases or decreases in attrition.
Currently most military conflict models continue to ignore such key factors in military strength as unit cohesion: esprit de corps, morale, morale influence, training, and discipline. One of the issues I see with the entropy-based warfare model developed by Booz Allen Hamilton is the degree of bias from the users who set the various levels of unit cohesion in the simulations. U.S. military planners have often over or under estimated an adversary’s qualities in these capabilities, often with tragic results.
The Booz Allen Hamilton entropy-based warfare model simulates the destruction or interference with an adversary’s C3CM (Command, Control, Communications, and Counter Measures) as having effect on an enemy unit in three crucial areas:
Maneuver derogation (slowing response time to adversary’s actions)
Disorganization (loss of unit cohesion – inability to coordinate actions, etc)
Critical function destruction (or attrition / destruction of assets)
A real word example of entropy-based warfare would be causing all three effects by destroying a unit’s command staff through combat action (physical destruction). Another means would be to isolate the command staff from coordinating their unit by systematically jamming all of their communications. Jamming is not currently considered in most warfare models as a variable. Some of the other variable not considered by most conflict models include: psychological operations and other information warfare techniques, stealth or camouflage, deception, signals intelligence, and reconnaissance activities. In essence, most models fail to account for what Clausewitz termed “the fog of war”.
The objective of the entropy-based warfare model is to teach command staff to again introduce the “fog of war” into the adversary’s concerns while keeping our own collection assets and command activities intact to ensure the effects of the “fog of war” are not felt by friendly forces. Previously existing military simulations failed to emphasize the importance of these force multipliers. The purpose of the new simulation is to reintroduce the effects of blitzkrieg into the modern battlefield. The use of the previously mentioned force multipliers can have the same paralyzing effects on an adversary’s forces as those witnessed by the allies in the opening moves of the Second World War. Some of the effect include: demoralization of the enemy, inducing the inability of enemy units to react to the changing situation, disrupting the enemy’s ability to coordinate activities which can lead to uncoordinated counter attacks and the encirclement of their forces, etc...
Previous wargaming models failed to take into account some aspects of the criticality of speed of operations. Modern computer supported command and control functions allow U.S. forces to maintain a far more rapid tempo of operations because of the speed in planning operations, and the dissemination of plans and intelligence. Modern precision munitions and stealth aircraft capabilities allows deep strikes against key enemy command and control assets with almost assured destruction. Jamming allows the isolation of those enemy assets whose command and control functions cannot be accurately located. The use of the entropy-based warfare model should help to reinforce our military commander’s use and reliance on these largely ignored assets.
The entropy-based warfare model captures neglected aspects of conflict that previous military simulations overlooked. Where previous attrition based models primarily emphasized quantity, the entropy-based warfare model creates a more balanced and advanced view of the modern battlefield and reinforces the use of the assets central to the success of U.S. forces. The new Booz Allen Hamilton simulation is a step forward in the advancement of military war-games. It fills a void in the use of several previously ignored force multipliers. The system still however does not simulate the need for other support services such as supply, medical evacuation, etc. For a command to properly function in combat, these variables also need to be addressed.
Booz Allen Hamilton has developed an Entropy-Based Warfare model that is used to create hypothetical wargaming situations reflecting the US military's vision of future warfare, in which the country's Armed Services increasingly embrace cutting-edge technologies to help achieve an advantage over adversaries. The entropy-based warfare model simulates the combined effects of friction, disruption, and lethality found in the modern battlefield in the adversary’s behavior. Developed jointly with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and unveiled in 1997, it's a computerized tool capable of modeling the full range of military actions (including conflict in the air, sea, ground, space, and cyberspace domains) in a single, integrated manner that (according to the company) better represents future warfare.
Virtually all previous models, simulations, and wargames were fundamentally attrition based and lacked the ability to account for the effects of friction and disruption that could be achieved by various other means short of physical or lethal force. Analytically they often provided quantitative results that support one recommendation over another. But they did not account for many factors that affect the outcome. The few that did quantify factors like command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, jamming, and reconnaissance lack an analytic construct to accurately account for their effects. They simply measured the influence of these factors as increases or decreases in attrition.
Currently most military conflict models continue to ignore such key factors in military strength as unit cohesion: esprit de corps, morale, morale influence, training, and discipline. One of the issues I see with the entropy-based warfare model developed by Booz Allen Hamilton is the degree of bias from the users who set the various levels of unit cohesion in the simulations. U.S. military planners have often over or under estimated an adversary’s qualities in these capabilities, often with tragic results.
The Booz Allen Hamilton entropy-based warfare model simulates the destruction or interference with an adversary’s C3CM (Command, Control, Communications, and Counter Measures) as having effect on an enemy unit in three crucial areas:
Maneuver derogation (slowing response time to adversary’s actions)
Disorganization (loss of unit cohesion – inability to coordinate actions, etc)
Critical function destruction (or attrition / destruction of assets)
A real word example of entropy-based warfare would be causing all three effects by destroying a unit’s command staff through combat action (physical destruction). Another means would be to isolate the command staff from coordinating their unit by systematically jamming all of their communications. Jamming is not currently considered in most warfare models as a variable. Some of the other variable not considered by most conflict models include: psychological operations and other information warfare techniques, stealth or camouflage, deception, signals intelligence, and reconnaissance activities. In essence, most models fail to account for what Clausewitz termed “the fog of war”.
The objective of the entropy-based warfare model is to teach command staff to again introduce the “fog of war” into the adversary’s concerns while keeping our own collection assets and command activities intact to ensure the effects of the “fog of war” are not felt by friendly forces. Previously existing military simulations failed to emphasize the importance of these force multipliers. The purpose of the new simulation is to reintroduce the effects of blitzkrieg into the modern battlefield. The use of the previously mentioned force multipliers can have the same paralyzing effects on an adversary’s forces as those witnessed by the allies in the opening moves of the Second World War. Some of the effect include: demoralization of the enemy, inducing the inability of enemy units to react to the changing situation, disrupting the enemy’s ability to coordinate activities which can lead to uncoordinated counter attacks and the encirclement of their forces, etc...
Previous wargaming models failed to take into account some aspects of the criticality of speed of operations. Modern computer supported command and control functions allow U.S. forces to maintain a far more rapid tempo of operations because of the speed in planning operations, and the dissemination of plans and intelligence. Modern precision munitions and stealth aircraft capabilities allows deep strikes against key enemy command and control assets with almost assured destruction. Jamming allows the isolation of those enemy assets whose command and control functions cannot be accurately located. The use of the entropy-based warfare model should help to reinforce our military commander’s use and reliance on these largely ignored assets.
The entropy-based warfare model captures neglected aspects of conflict that previous military simulations overlooked. Where previous attrition based models primarily emphasized quantity, the entropy-based warfare model creates a more balanced and advanced view of the modern battlefield and reinforces the use of the assets central to the success of U.S. forces. The new Booz Allen Hamilton simulation is a step forward in the advancement of military war-games. It fills a void in the use of several previously ignored force multipliers. The system still however does not simulate the need for other support services such as supply, medical evacuation, etc. For a command to properly function in combat, these variables also need to be addressed.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)